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                                     Will Trustees Tame Tuition?
                                                     by
                                      Ronald G. Ehrenberg*
*Ronald G. Ehrenberg is the Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor
Relations and Economics at Cornell University and Director of the Cornell Higher
Education Research Institute. From 1995 to 1998 he served as Cornell’s Vice
President for Academic Programs, Planning and Budgeting. This essay draws from
his book Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much (Harvard University Press,
2000)
                      (Prepared for the Chronicle of Higher Education
Tuition Rising
1 Over 30 years ago William Bowen showed that tuition at a set of selective private
academic institutions had been rising, on average, by 2 to 3 percent more annually than the
rate of inflation since the turn of the 20th century. The increased specialization of
knowledge and the growth of new fields of study were part of the reason that this had
occurred. But first and foremost, it had occurred because the nature of the educational
process did not permit academia to share in the productivity gains that were leading to the
growth of earnings in the rest of society.
Put simply, the number of students the average faculty member educated each year
had not changed because low student/faculty ratios were thought to be essential to high
quality education. Hence to avoid a decline in the relative earnings of faculty, that might
make it difficult to retain existing, and attract new, faculty, tuition had to be increased by
more than inflation to provide revenue for salary increases. Inasmuch as real wage growth
and increased female labor force participation rates had caused real family incomes to
increase during the period, tuition had not risen, on average relative to median family
income.
In recent years, tuition has similarly continued to increase by more than inflation.
However, during the 1980s real income growth stagnated in the United States. As a result,
tuition as a share of family income increased. Data for Cornell University illustrate this
point but the story is the same for the average selective private institution in the nation.
Between 1966-67 and 1979-80 Cornell tuition remained roughly 26 to 28 percent of
median family income. By 1992-93 it had risen to 49 percent. During the mid-1990s,
median family income again began to increase in real terms and the ratio stabilized.
2However, the damage had been done. The public’s concern that college costs were taking
a greater share of the typical family’s income was magnified by the rapid run up in
endowments that accompanied the booming stock market of the 1990s. Families
wondered why the selective institutions had to raise tuition at all?
 In Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much, I argue that there are a number of
forces, in addition to the ones Bowen discussed, that continue to put upward pressure on
tuition at selective private institutions. These include their aspirations, our “winner take
all” society, their shared system of governance, recent federal government policies, the
role of external actors such as alumni, local government, the environmental movement and
historic preservationists, periodicals that rank them, and how they are organized for
budgetary purposes and select and reward their deans. Today I will focus on shared
governance and the key role that trustees play.
Shared Governance
Why selective private institutions fail to seriously consider the option of reducing
their costs, rather than raising tuition, to find the revenue to enhance their operations
derives to a large extent from their system of shared governance between trustees,
administrators, and faculty. Trustees are often successful business people, who know how
to cut costs and meet budget constraints. However, if the President of a university, such as
Cornell, tells them that they need to spend money for new initiatives in genomics,
advanced materials and information sciences to maintain the strength of the university and
keep it at the forefront of science and engineering, they are likely to swallow hard and go
along with him. If the President similarly says that they need funds to enhance the living
3and learning environment at the university to attract students, they similarly will likely
agree.
 An important distinction exists, however, betw en trustees of private and public
universities, which some background data will help make clear. In 1978-79, the average
full professor at a public doctorate granting university earned about 91% of what his
counterpart at private doctorate granting universities earned. This ratio fell steadily during
the 1980s and early 1990s until it stabilized at about 78 to 80%. The decline in public
universities’ relative salaries made it difficult for the publics to hire and retain top faculty.
Similarly, between 1988 and 1994, state appropriations to public higher education
per full-time student fell in real terms by about 10%. While tuition increases made up for
part of this decline, in real terms spending per student fell at many state institutions.
During the same time period real expenditures per student were relentlessly increasing at
the selective privates. Hence the disparity between the funding of the two types of
institutions grew.
Do these data suggest that trustees of public institutions care less about the quality
of their institutions than do trustees of private institutions? In most cases the answer is no,
although in some states faculty do have serious questions about the trustees’ goals.
However, unlike private university trustees, public university trustees often do not have
final control over their institution’s tuition level or its state appropriation. The political
process often makes these decisions.
In some states, such as New York, the public university trustees do set tuition.
However, if the governor lets them know (as Governor Pataki repeatedly has in New
York) that he wants tuition held constant, it would be foolhardy for the trustees not to
4accede to his wishes. To do might risk loss of their positions and the possibility that the
state might reduce the university’s state appropriation by the amount of the increase in
revenue that they projected gaining by the proposed increase in tuition. So budgets in
public institutions have been cut and tuition increases moderated in spite of their trustees
concern. Faced with tight budgets, presidents and provosts at the publics make hard
decisions and take the steps necessary to balance their budgets. They can always blame the
cuts that they must make on state government.
 In contrast, if administrators at private institutions were to recommend budget
cutbacks, all blame would be assigned to them. They faculty would accuse them of not
having made a strong enough case to the trustees of the need for higher tuition to maintain
institutional quality. Rather than risk losing the support of the faculty, the president and
provost will often swallow hard and recommend raising tuition by more than they
otherwise would prefer. After all, administrative terms are not that long and once an
administrator loses faculty support it is often difficult for him to lead the institution
Why is the support of the faculty so important?  Under these institutions’ system of
shared governance, the faculty rules supreme on academic matters. The faculty also feels
that it should play a major role in all other decisions. To achieve faculty support for
projects is often expensive, both in terms of time and dollars. At Cornell for example, the
estimated cost of a major new advanced materials research facility has risen from $40
million to $58.5 million dollars because of modifications that were needed to win faculty
support for where the building will be located. These modifications, atria to improve the
college’s environment and improved classrooms, had nothing to do with the underlying
research program for which the building was being constructed.
5Why Should Society Care About Tuition Levels at Selective Private Colleges and
Universities
Why should society care about the tuition levels at selective private colleges and
universities? Although people with modest incomes can only shake their heads in disbelief
at new homes that cost over $1 million, or luxury cars that cost over $50,000, few argue
that price ceilings should be placed on new homes or new cars. Most believe that the rich
have the right to spend their money however they please. Of course those of us with lower
income levels see little reason why we should subsidize their purchases. This is one reason
why Congress has limited the deductibility of mortgage interest payments for vacation
homes.
The public at large does, however, subsidize the selective private colleges and
universities. These institutions benefit from a set of tax advantages under federal and state
tax statutes. Contributions they receive from individuals and corporations are deductible
from federal and state personal and corporate income taxes. Higher educational
institutions received over $17 billion in annual giving in 1998-99 and almost $6 billion of
this total went to private research universities. Not surprisingly, research indicates that
these tax deductions cause the annual giving that higher educational institutions receive to
be higher than would otherwise be the case.
The income they earn each year from their endowments is also not taxed. The 509
institutions with large endowments that participated in a 1998 NAUCBO study reported
endowment assets that totaled over $178 billion dollars at the end of the fiscal year. If the
income and realized capital gains that these assets produced were 10%, this would
represent almost $18 billion dollars of income that was not subject to federal and state
6income taxes.  Similarly, the properties that they own that are used for educational
purposes are exempt from local property taxes and they can often borrow funds at lower,
tax-exempt, interest rates, Because of these tax exemptions at the federal, state and local
levels, the public at large is subsidizing the activities of the selective private institutions to
the tune of literally tens of billions of dollars each year.
The public’s willingness to bear such costs is based upon the belief that these
institutions yield broad benefits to society as a whole. However, in the future it is unlikely
that the selective private institutions will be able justify this support solely by referring to
the social value of their research or to the value that society gets from having high quality
private educational alternatives. Rather, they will likely have to demonstrate that they
remain accessible to potential students from all socioeconomic backgrounds. Unless they
moderate their rates of tuition increases, or American family incomes start to grow more
rapidly, this will require then to increasingly provide need-based financial aid to students
from lower and middle-income families so that these students can continue to attend them.
 While the richest selective privates, such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton have the
resources to increase their financial aid budgets substantially, and have already done so,
many of the other privates do not have such resources. Hence the pressure on them to
moderate their tuition increases will likely increase. If they fail to do so, the selective
privates as a group run the risk of losing much of their political support and facing a
reduction in their privileged tax status.
This threat is not idle speculation. The process of nipping away at the tax-exempt
status of their income and their property has already begun. At Cornell, for example, the
revenue generated by the hotel school’s on-campus “teaching hotel” is now subject to
7state and county sales taxes. Similarly, numerous reports of efforts to tax the earnings that
institutions receive from the sale of luxury boxes in football stadiums have been reported
nationwide
What the Private Institutions Can Do to Help Hold Down Undergraduate Tuition
Increases
             To achieve some moderation in the future real rate of tuition increases will require
actions from federal and state government and the institutions themselves. Tuition Rising
discusses a set of these actions in detail; her  my focus is on the role of the institutions’
trustees. As my discussion of the differences between public and private institutions
indicated the trustees of the latter must be the key actors if serious efforts to hold down
costs and moderate tuition increases are to be made at the selective private institutions.
Absent, strong leadership from the trustees, it is difficult for presidents and provosts to
advocate such policies. Rice University is one selective private institution at which
historically the trustees have provided such leadership.
Should trustees advocate such policies? In part it depends upon the wealth of their
institutions and their institutions’ abilities to maintain their accessibility to students from all
socioeconomic backgrounds through their financial aid programs. If accessibility is
maintained, political pressure on the institutions is unlikely to grow and slowing down the
rate of tuition increase will not figure prominently in policy discussions.
 In part, given each institution’s goal of being the very best that it can in all aspects
of its operations, it depends upon the institutions’ abilities to slow down the increase in
their costs by taking actions to improve their efficiencies in academic and nonacademic
areas. Administrators often find it difficult to take such actions because trustees are
8graduates of particular colleges or departments within the institution and often think about
what is best for “their unit” rather than what is best for the institution as a whole. Hence
administrative efforts to improve efficiencies that result in restrictions in the growth of
particular units, or perish the thought, actually cut backs in their budgets, often run into
trustee opposition.  Deans, department chairs and even individual faculty members have
been known to talk to trustees when the central administration is contemplating an action
that they feel will be disadvantageous to the trustees’ favorite unit. The trustees, in turn,
have been known to put pressure on the central administration not to take the action.
Numerous times while I was a vice president at Cornell my colleagues and I faced such
pressures.
Accordingly, central administrators will have to do a much better job than they
have in the past at many institutions of explaining to key trustee supporters of each of their
units that what is best for the unit is not necessarily best for the institution as a whole.
They will have to “sell” the trustees on the importance of units cooperating to reduce
costs and set priorities.
Trustees and administrators at these institutions should also realize that if they do
not undertake efforts to improve their institutions’ efficiency and reduce their costs they
run the risk of eventually losing some of their corporate support. Given the efforts that
corporations are making to cut costs, academic institutions cannot appear to be wasting
resources. Trustees should thus demand that their administrators regularly report their
progress at achieving cost savings.
 One way that administrators can achieve cost savings is to share resources
between institutions. For example, Yale, Columbia and the New York Public Library are
9building a single off-campus library storage facility that will house rarely used books from
the three institutions. By pooling their rare book collections, the three institutions can
deacquisition duplicate copies and achieve considerable savings. Numerous other ways
that institutions can share academic nd administrative resources are discussed in Tuition
Rising.
 Trustees need also to push their institutions to diversify their revenue sources so
that undergraduate students’ tuition payments do not have to bear the brunt of funding
increases in institutional costs. The extent to which this diversification comes from
increased fund raising activities, increased professional masters programs, increased
continuing and executive education activities, increased distance learning activities, and/or
increased revenue from the commercialization of faculty research, will differ from
institution to institution. However, diversification of revenue sources will be one of the
keys to taking the pressure off of undergraduate tuition increases at the selective private
institutions.
Trustee leadership in these areas is very important. For example, several articles
published in the Chronicle in recent months should have made it clear to readers the
trustees were way ahead of the faculty at Cornell in recognizing the institution’s need to
focus on distance learning activities to generate revenues. While faculty resistance to the
for-profit corporation, e-Cornell, that was proposed by the administration to operate
revenue-producing distance learning activities has modified the form that this corporation
will take, it was the trustee pressure on the administration to come up with an initial plan
that has moved the institution forward. Intellectual honesty requires me to report that this
10
plan was developed after my term as a Cornell vice president and I can take neither credit
nor blame for it.
